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Offender Rehabilitation: Current
Problems and Ethically Informed
Approaches to Intervention
Andrew Day
Rehabilitation programmes are widely offered to offenders in custodial and
community settings around the world. Despite the existence of a large evidence
base that identifies features of effective practice, levels of programme
integrity remain low and are widely believed to undermine successful rehabi-
litation. In this paper it is suggested that conceptualising rehabilitation as a
moral activity which involves assisting offenders to make better ethical
decisions is one way to address some of the difficulties in the delivery of
rehabilitation programmes that potentially lead to low levels of integrity,
thereby increasing effectiveness.
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A New Crisis in Offender Rehabilitation?
It would probably not be overly melodramatic to suggest that the field of
offender rehabilitation is facing a new crisis. Whilst the 1970s and 1980s notion
that we cannot (and perhaps should not even try) to rehabilitate has now largely
given way to the belief that rehabilitation is indeed possible (Martinson 1974),
recent years have seen significant concerns expressed about both the quality and
integrity of rehabilitative practice (Andrews 2006; Bonta et al. 2008), and
significant gaps in knowledge remain (Andrews & Dowden 2007). For example,
one review by Morgan et al. (2007, cited in Andrews & Bonta 2010, p. 51) of 374
correctional programmes concluded that the majority (61 per cent, N230)
failed to reach even a basic level of adherence to good practice principles, with
less than 1 per cent (n6) of forensic mental health service documents making
any reference to targeting criminogenic need.
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Furthermore, a meta-analysis of the effects of community supervision
conducted by Bonta et al. (2008) found little evidence that current supervision
practices reduce recidivism, explaining these somewhat disappointing findings
with reference to what were apparently low levels of adherence to the principles
of risk and need, and an underuse of behavioural techniques and prosocial
modelling methods (see also Listwan et al. 2006).
The purpose of this paper is, however, not to further lament the problems that
arise in trying to implement evidence-based policy in rehabilitation services or,
indeed, to offer a critique of the ways in which evidence can be used to shape
public policy (see Pawson 2006). Rather, the aim is to consider why adhering to
those principles of offender rehabilitation that have been empirically derived and
are theoretically defensible (Andrews & Bonta 2010), endorsed by prison and
probation services around the Western world (Ogloff & Davis 2004; Wormwith
et al. 2007), and which form the basis for most programme accreditation,
inspection, and review systems (Day in press), appears to present such a major
challenge for service providers.
Whilst many of the concerns about low levels of programme integrity (see
above) have focused on a lack of appropriate assessment and offender classifica-
tion processes, programme integrity is also a term that relates to both the way in
which programmes are actually delivered and the quality of programme delivery
(Hollin 1995). In relation to mental health treatments, Waltz et al. (1993) have
suggested that assessing integrity can be understood as involving two components:
adherence to the treatment protocol, and competence in delivering the
treatment. Attempts to increase the integrity of programmes have, in part,
been behind the move towards standardised treatment manuals and protocols that
characterise many contemporary rehabilitation programmes. The argument
presented in this paper is that rehabilitation programme providers often
experience a number of difficulties that prevent them from delivering programmes
in the manner in which they were intended, and that these difficulties can
collectively be understood in relation to a lack of consideration of the ethical
underpinnings of human behaviour. Alternative approaches to working with
offenders are described which, it is suggested, offer some significant opportunities
for the development of an ethical basis for rehabilitation programmes.
What is Offender Rehabilitation?
Modern approaches to offender rehabilitation have been based largely on
cognitive behavioural models which locate the causes of offending within the
individual. Antisocial (offending) behaviour is explained in terms of various socio-
cognitive deficits that significantly impair not only the capacity to reason but
also how the individual sees and understands the self, other people, and the
world more generally (Ross & Fabiano 1985). In other words, offenders are
typically seen as lacking the social problem-solving skills necessary to identify
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and deal with problems that are typically associated with everyday living
(McMurran et al. 2001).1 The focus of intervention is often on changing
maladaptive cognitions, or what are commonly referred to as cognitive
distortions. This is a term which has become widely used to refer to particular
beliefs that are considered to be important causal antecedents to offending (i.e.
criminogenic), and have been classified in terms of either primary (self-centred
attitudes, thoughts and beliefs), or secondary (blaming others, minimising/
mislabelling, and assuming the worst of others). The latter are commonly
understood in terms of post hoc rationalisations and justifications of the
offending behaviour (see Gibbs et al. 1995). Programmes are typically delivered
in small groups settings by psychologists and social workers, and participants are
encouraged to use the Socratic method to confront and challenge each other
when comments are made that suggest the presence of cognitive distortions.
Many contemporary rehabilitation programmes draw explicitly on what has
been termed the Personal, Interpersonal, and Community Reinforcement (PIC-R)
perspective (Andrews 2006; Bonta & Andrews 2003). The PIC-R is a general
personality and cognitive-social-learning theory of criminal behaviour which
suggests that human beings have a high level of agency over their behaviour.
Andrews and Dowden (2007) describe it in the following way:
Human beings are active, conscious, and wilful, and they are goal-oriented. They
are also creatures with biological dispositions and habits and conditioning
histories whereby repeated associations among stimuli, responses, and beha-
vioural outcomes can produce automatic, non-conscious cognitive regulation of
motivation, perception, and behaviour. Their behaviour is under personal
control, interpersonal control, and automatic control. (2007, p. 442)
Individual differences are thus regarded as important, particularly in relation to
the levels of self-control that individuals are able to exert over their behaviour.
This, in turn, is influenced by the skills with which the individual is equipped (e.g.
ability to problem solve, self-monitor and evaluate behaviour, and cope with
temptation), and personal standards around behaviour (e.g. attitudes, beliefs,
values, rationalisations, identities).
Some Possible Explanations for Low Levels of Integrity?
So why is it that programmes are apparently so often not delivered in the ways in
which they were intended? It is easy to speculate about the range of different
constraints that rehabilitation providers routinely face in their work that prevent
them from implementing programmes in the way that was intended by
1. This is not to say that the presence or absence of such skills differentiates between offenders and
non-offenders; or that all offenders lack these skills either wholly or in part. Rather, persistent
offenders fail to apply social problem-solving skills due to difficulties with such things as problem
recognition, selecting and generating solutions, and understanding the likely outcomes of particular
behaviour.
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programme designers. There could, for example, be resourcing issues, manage-
ment practices, staff skill shortages (and so on) that create a policy implementa-
tion gap. However, in some jurisdictions at least, there is evidence that
rehabilitation programmes are still being regularly delivered, and perhaps even
more frequently that at any stage in the past (Heseltine et al. 2011). It seems,
therefore, that the capacity to deliver programmes exists, and that additional
explanations for low levels of programme integrity are required.
The most obvious explanation, perhaps, is that some programme providers
simply do not subscribe to what is currently considered to be evidence-based
practice as it has been operationalised at a policy level through programme
standards and systems of accreditation and audit. It is certainly true that models
of differentiated case management based on the principles of risk, criminogenic
need, and responsivity have been subject to a number of critiques since they
were originally proposed. Ward and Stewart (2003), for example, voice concerns
that these models led to an overly narrow conception of risk, models of
intervention that are insufficiently individualised, and that placed emphasis on
individual pathology or deficits (rather than strengths) and neglected the
role that agency and personal identity play in the rehabilitative process. It is
possible that such critiques, whilst strongly refuted by those who argue that they
are unsubstantiated by empirical evidence (see Bonta & Andrews 2003), resonate
with programme providers. For example, in relation to sexual offender treat-
ment, a recent survey of North American sex offender treatment programmes,
McGrath et al. (2010) noted that whilst the risk, need, and responsivity (RNR)
model2 forms the cornerstone of national adult sex offender treatment
programmes in several countries, including Canada, England, Scotland, and
Hong Kong, it was typically endorsed by less than a third of the programmes they
surveyed, with other approaches (e.g. relapse prevention, self-regulation and
Good Lives, sexual trauma) more likely to underpin service provision. This is
notwithstanding evidence that the ‘what works’ principles are associated with
effective sexual offender treatment (see, for example, Olver et al.’s (2009)
conclusion that ‘treatment adhering to the what works principles can reduce
long-term sexual recidivism for a moderate- to high-risk group of sex offenders’
(p. 522)). In other words, whilst criminal justice policy is in line with the current
empirical evidence base, practitioners remain cautious about implementing such
programmes.
A second, and possibly related, possibility is that some professionals who are
involved in programme delivery simply do not have confidence in the
programmes they are expected to deliver and, as such, are easily deflected
away from those activities and methods that are suggested. For example,
although cognitive-behavioural treatment methods have been associated with
better rehabilitative outcomes (Landenberger & Lipsey 2005), they have been
adapted from the field of mental health, and are essentially psychological (and,
2. This is a model that, in essence, suggests that higher risk offenders should receive more intensive
programmes, aimed at areas of need that are directly associated with their offending.
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at times, pathological) in orientation. The causes of crime are located firmly
within the individual (see above), and affords offenders a high level of agency
and capacity to act and think reasonably. Practitioners from non-psychological
and social welfare backgrounds may simply not subscribe fully to this theory of
crime. They may, for example, feel that social factors (such as unemployment,
housing, and social disadvantage) are equally important determinants of crime
and, as such, that psychological programmes are unlikely to be sufficiently
powerful to effect change. Indeed, there is a considerable body of knowledge
from contemporary criminology to support this view (Laws & Ward 2011;
Porporino 2008), and social influences on offending are particularly apparent
when one considers the need to understand domestic violence, for example,
from a gendered perspective (Pence & Paymar 2003), or to explain the over-
representation of minority cultural groups in criminal justice settings. In the
country in which I work, for example, Indigenous offenders (those who identify as
from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural backgrounds) constitute less
than 2 per cent of the total Australian population, yet make up over 20 per cent
of the prison population (Day et al. 2003). As a result, practitioners may find
themselves focusing less on individual characteristics (such as cognitive distor-
tion) in group sessions, and dedicating more time to a consideration of the
broader context in which offending occurs. Interventions thus become less
criminogenically targeted, and integrity levels drop.
A third potential explanation relates to the very real difficulties experienced
by practitioners in actually delivering programmes. Renwick et al. (1997) have
commented on this issue, noting how difficult some offenders are to work with,
pointing to the resentful, distrustful and even combative style of some
participants in therapeutic groups, and enduring problems of low motivation,
treatment resistance, and avoidance. They suggest that this may often disrupts
therapeutic work, and can contribute to a failure to adhere to treatment plans.
In addition, programme facilitators may also experience strong reactions to
participants who are frightening or intimidating. In their focus groups with
programme facilitators, Kozar (2010) describes many situations in which
facilitators thought they were going to be attacked, or had direct and indirect
threats made towards them. It is possible to speculate that this may lead
facilitators to be manipulated, both overtly and covertly, such that they deviate
from intervention plans. Kozar further suggests that it may also prompt some to
act in ways that are counter-therapeutic, such as avoiding dealing directly with
violence, or becoming overly reactive or punitive.
A final (and related) possibility is that rehabilitation providers simply believe
that some clients are ‘untreatable’ and incapable of change. This may sound like
a strange proposition for those who dedicate their working lives to the
rehabilitation of offenders, but consider the debates over whether it is possible
to rehabilitate ‘psychopaths’ (Hare 2006), or perhaps ‘life course persistent’
young offenders (Moffit et al. 1996). These are clients for whom there is a
common view that enduring personality traits (and possibly neuropsychological
deficits), severely limit their potential for rehabilitation. There is currently an
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insufficient evidence base to know whether those with severe personality
disorders can be successfully rehabilitated (see Day & Bryan 2007; Livesley
2001), and a wide range of views are held by practitioners on such issues.
Additionally, there may be the view that some offenders, by virtue of their
behaviour, are not simply deserving of therapeutic services. While the criminal
law is centred on the idea of moral responsibility and associated concepts such as
just deserts, autonomy, blame, mitigation, harm, risk, and culpability (Ward
et al. 2009), discussion of these ideas rarely surfaces in the rehabilitation
literature, and how it affects rehabilitative practice. A notable exception to this
is Glaser’s (2003) analysis of sexual offender treatment programmes in which he
argues that much of treatment is essentially punitive in nature.
Ethics and Offender Rehabilitation
Moral questions frequently underpin rehabilitative practice, and yet are rarely
explicit in programme manuals. Consider, for example, the offender who
assaulted a man who was sexually interested in his partner, or who insulted or
threatened a family member. Rehabilitation will typically focus on what he did
wrong (e.g. highlight the important role that attributions play in influencing both
anger arousal and aggression, perceive the intentions of others as hostile,
particularly when feeling under threat or when the situation is ambiguous), but
do not typically address the ethical basis of behaviour in any considered manner
(e.g. when is it wrong to act aggressively?). In short, what seems to be noticeably
absent from many rehabilitation programmes is any formal consideration of the
ethical underpinnings of antisocial and criminal behaviour. Indeed, there has
been remarkably little consideration of the values that underpin practice,
despite suggestions that values are always implicit in what researchers and
practitioners say or do and evident in the discrepancies that sometimes exist
between how offenders think and how they behave (Ward & Maruna 2007). Day
and Ward (2010) have recently proposed that values play a significant role in
offender rehabilitation theories because they serve to identify therapeutic goals
and to place boundaries on what might be considered to be appropriate
rehabilitative attempts. They also inform decisions about how to balance the
needs of individual offenders with those of the community when developing
intervention and management plans.
The basic proposition presented in this paper is that a potentially powerful
explanation for low levels of programme integrity relates to the inability or
unwillingness of rehabilitation providers to articulate the ethical basis of their
programmes. An ethical framework for rehabilitative practice can not only clarify
the underlying purpose of any intervention for the practitioner but also
potentially successfully engage the offender in the pursuit of a ‘better life’,
thereby reducing the difficult presentations that facilitators have to manage and
clarify issues relating to the potential for change or ‘treatability’. The
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description of the dominant theory of rehabilitation (the PIC-R; see above)
contains no substantive reference to issues of morality or ethical decision
making. There is passing reference to ‘personal standards’ and ‘values’, but
surprisingly few programmes have been developed where this aspect of the
theory has been operationalised in an intervention.3
Culturally, it is possible to frame questions about morality within broader
philosophical debates about the extent to which ethical behaviour is something
that can be taught. A commonly cited starting place for approaching this topic is
the writings of Aristotle who, in the fourth century bc, proposed that the
development of moral character occurs through socialisation which gives children
‘a taste for what is good’. Aristotle thought that ethical behaviour could be
taught, but only when the habits of virtue, morality, and independence of mind
(or perhaps in modern parlance ‘healthy personality structures’) were developed
first. In short, Aristotle gave a central role to personality, seeing the person’s
character as the basis for their moral life. Some of Aristotle’s ideas were later
revived by Thomas Aquinas in what has become known as Christian ‘virtue
ethics’, and have subsequently provided a basis for much Western thought on the
causes of antisocial behaviour.
Of course, religious traditions also see divine agents as influencing behaviour
and this may be another view that is held by some offenders and practitioners.
Religions can be regarded as resources of moral wisdom, and moral failure or
oversight. They are, in other words, the collective wisdom of generations of
people trying to establish what it means to lead a moral life. Rather usefully,
religions have a descriptive dimension (how different religions understand what
happens in the world), a normative dimension (the norms and values that ought
to guide life), as well as a practical dimension (‘what are we to do?’). It is this
latter dimension that is often lacking in secular ethical frameworks. Kant, for
example, attempted to build knowledge on a human foundation, identifying a
number of widely known ethical principles that underpin most professional codes
of ethics (e.g. autonomy, non-maleficence, do good, act fairly and so on). The
approach has led to the articulation of a number of laws and rules about ethical
behaviour, but on their own do not motivate action. Rather, it has been suggested
that codes of ethics will make sense only if they build on what is happening in the
person’s character (e.g. Day & White 2008), and by themselves do not bring
sufficient content to guide behaviour (i.e. as soon as you ask what it means to
harm another person then these principles seem inadequate, and the question
arises ‘what do we think of as a good human life’?).
Although religious programmes (other than 12-step programmes for substance
use and gambling) are not typically considered to be offender rehabilita-
tion programmes, they are important to consider here, especially given the
suggestion of Johnson et al. (1997) that ‘religious programmes for inmates are
3. Notable exceptions to this can be found in programmes such as Aggression Replacement Therapy
(Goldstein et al. 2004), and Moral Reconation Therapy (Armstrong 2003), but both of these
programmes fail to articulate a coherent model of morality, values, or ethical decision making
(beyond that of Piaget and Kohlberg).
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not only among the oldest, but also among the most common forms of
rehabilitative programmes found in correctional facilities today’ (1997, p. 146),
in the United States at least. While a more general literature has developed on
the relationship between religion and crime (for a meta-analysis, see Baier &
Wright 2001), and more recent research has examined incarcerated individuals,
their offences, and religious/spiritual orientation (e.g. Fernander et al. 2005),
religious programmes for offenders have rarely been the subject of empirical
evaluation or theoretical critique. This is in spite of the claims of Johnson et al.
(1997) and others, as well as research indicating the widespread use of such
programmes. For example, O’Connor and Perryclear (2002) report that in 1996,
49 per cent of inmates at the Leiber Correctional Institution (United States) had
attended a religious-based programme or service (e.g. bible study, worship,
substance use programmes), with at least 23 different religious ‘programmes’
being run at that institution during that year. It is evident that what is needed is
some attempt to articulate what might considered to be the ‘programme logic’ of
religious initiatives for offenders that aim also to rehabilitate. This would seem to
entail some consideration of the ethical basis of human behaviour from the
perspective of the particular religion, followed by an attempt to heighten
problem awareness, strengthen commitment to change and, perhaps, offer
support such that changes can be sustained following release into the community.
The Good Lives Model of Offender Rehabilitation
It is only relatively recently that alternative models of rehabilitation have begun
to emerge that have the capacity to consider ethical issues directly. Most notably,
the Good Lives Model (GLM) (Ward & Maruna 2007) draws attention to the ways in
which a broader set of offender needs (or what are termed ‘primary goods’) may
be identified as rehabilitation targets and, importantly, to the role that values
play in the rehabilitative process. In short, rather than understanding offending
as a skills deficit, it is approached as a moral issue. Although the model has only
recently been operationalised in a manner that allows empirical evaluation (Laws
& Ward 2011), it nonetheless represents a framework for the practice of
rehabilitation that invites a broad consideration of ethical behaviour without
invoking the normative dimension of any particular religion. Rather than focusing
on deficits (as is the case in many programmes based on the PIC-R), the GLM aims
to be strength based, taking offenders’ personal preferences and values seriously
(the things that matter most to them in the world*drawing upon these to
motivate individuals to live better lives) (Day, Ward & Shirley 2011). This
positioning of the GLM has clear implications for practice. It follows, for
example, that any programme that purports to be based on the GLM approach
relies on participants being open and honest in their discussions*people have to
say what they really think, rather than what they think the programme facilitator
wants them to say if they are develop ethical decision-making skills. This
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contrasts somewhat with the focus on ‘treatment’ or ‘psycho-education’ that is
evident in so many contemporary rehabilitation programmes.
The philosophical basis of such methods can be traced back to the writings of
Socrates who believed, in contrast to Aristotle, that people can develop their
own sense of right and wrong and that morality is essentially educable. The
Socratic method is, of course, enshrined in the cognitive behavioural approach,
and is premised on the notion that there is no unique right answer to questions of
how to behave, and that the therapist or teacher should not work in ways that are
overly prescriptive. Of course, there can clearly be better and worse answers and
so, for Socrates, the process of moral development is based on opening up views
and opinions to thoughtful criticism and scrutiny. Such an approach is much more
compatible with psychotherapeutic approaches advocated by some as likely to be
most effective with prisoners (e.g. Marshall et al. 2003) given that it focuses as
much on group process as it does on risk management (Thomas-Peter 2006).
Although current conceptualisations of the GLM tend to focus on ways in which
these ideas can be integrated with mainstream case management models and
promote the use of cognitive-behavioural methods of intervention (Ward &
Maruna 2007), there are some examples of other rehabilitative methods that are
recognised. Fowers (2006), for example, offers what he terms a ‘frankly moral
dialogue’ in relation to the application of virtue ethics to psychotherapy as a
means of ‘helping clients to cultivate the best in themselves and to live the best
kind of life available to them’ (2006, p. 39). Such comments resonate with the
growing interest in how life narratives can shape the meaning and value that are
attributed to life experiences. Indeed, examination of personal identity is
considered to be a central feature of any GLM-informed approach to offender
rehabilitation. Although there is much work to be done to develop (and test)
these ideas in offender programmes, Waldrom (2010) offers an important analysis
of how narrative approaches can be used as an alternative to cognitive-
behavioural methods of sexual offender treatment. It is clear from this account
that such approaches are centrally concerned with uncovering the moral basis for
antisocial behaviour. As Waldrom puts it:
The narrative strategies offenders employ, and the broader narratives within
which they are embedded, often reveal seeds of moral agency, that is, an ability
to recognize both one’s own moral sensibility and the personal agency to act in a
moral manner. Specifically, what we see in these strategies is evidence of moral
selfhood, a positive and inherently moral identity despite the commission of
crimes considered by many to be acts of immorality or amorality. Recognizing
that sexual offenders are morally imbued individuals who do act in moral ways,
allowing that morality to surface through narrative and appealing to it should
contribute positively to their rehabilitation. (2010, p. 252)
Quayle et al. (2006) propose another way in which values might be addressed in
psychological therapy with offenders. They have argued that one strategy for
persuading offenders to forgo immediate gratification (in this case, the use of
Internet pornography, but their argument extends logically to other offence
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types) is through asking them to explicitly state their values and consider how
immediate gratification might inhibit their ability to fulfil those values. They
describe ‘values-oriented’ interventions in which clients are asked to ‘value with
their feet, and to begin to experience their life as chosen rather than imposed’
(2006, p. 2). These interventions involve a detailed assessment of client values,
followed by the generation of goals and actions that are relevant to those values,
and then work on those private events, particularly negative emotional states,
that act as barriers to putting values into action.
Conclusion
Smith et al. (2009) concluded their review of criminal justice programmes with
the comment that effectiveness is often ‘compromised by staff drift and
organisational resistance at both the frontline and administrative levels’, and
that the issue of programme integrity is an ‘ongoing problem of major
proportions’ (2009, p. 162). This paper raises the possibility that low levels of
programme integrity are, in part, a function of disagreement about the goals and
value of rehabilitation programmes, difficulties in managing clients, and
pessimism that some offenders are able to change. It is suggested that these
factors combine to influence programme delivery such that facilitators work in
ways that are different from those intended by programme designers. Under-
pinning these problems, it is further proposed, is a lack of attention to the moral
and ethical basis of programmes or the moral vacuum in which many rehabilita-
tion practitioners work (see Day & Ward 2010). For levels of programme integrity
to improve, models of rehabilitation need to be developed that attend seriously
to the ethical problems posed by those who act in ways that are harmful or
antisocial. Although recently developed models of rehabilitation such as the
Good Lives Model go some way to approaching this issue, much more work is
needed to translate ideas of moral education into successful rehabilitative
practice. This may involve the further development of alternative methods of
programme delivery, such as those that emphasise the role that narrative plays in
shaping personal identity and regulating behaviour. Nonetheless, given the
problems with low levels of programme integrity that are experienced in many
current rehabilitation programmes, this would appear to be one area of inquiry
that is worthy of further thought and research.
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